Selling Failed Banks
63 Pages Posted: 17 Aug 2014 Last revised: 14 May 2015
There are 2 versions of this paper
Selling Failed Banks
Selling Failed Banks
Date Written: April 10, 2015
Abstract
We show that the allocation of failed banks in the Great Recession was likely distorted because potential acquirers of these banks were poorly capitalized. We illustrate this phenomenon within a model of auctions with budget constraints. In our model poor capitalization of some potential acquirers drives a wedge between their willingness to pay and the ability to pay for a failed bank. Using our framework, we infer three characteristics that drive potential acquirers’ willingness to pay for a failed bank in the data: geographic proximity, bank specialization, and increased market concentration. Consistent with predictions of our model, we find that low capitalization of potential acquirers decreases their ability to acquire a failed bank. Finally, we show that the wedge between potential acquirers’ willingness and ability to pay distorts the allocation of failed banks. The costs of this misallocation are substantial, as measured by the additional resolution costs of the FDIC. These findings have direct implications for the design of the bank resolution process.
Keywords: Failed banks, Banking crisis, Regulation, Bail-outs, Resolution
JEL Classification: E65, G18, G21
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation